



Classical Bulletin

Issue 4, 2018

doi:10.33909/cb/94.2018.04.47

---

## **Social structure and the field we now call gender – adequate to the task of understanding the complex realities of relations between and among men and women**

**By: Nguyen-Gillham**

*Sechenov First Moscow State Med Univ, Dept Hist Med, Moscow, Russia.*

---

### ABSTRACT

The various socio-environmental or socioterritorial conflicts, which are manifested in almost the entire region, have a particularly paradoxical connotation in countries such as Bolivia, where, despite the constitutional recognition of the plurinational character of the State, there are now signs of re-centralization and restoration monologue of the nation-state hand in hand with a decided process of expansion and intensification of extractivism. This supposes great setbacks in the mandates of plurinational transformation, decolonization and of "Living Well" present in the current constitutional text.

In the previous decade we witnessed a period of articulation of a counter-hegemonic horizon in Bolivia, which was expressed through processes of unification, mobilization and societal articulation (Tapia, 2008) from indigenous community movements, which activated and amalgamated from the defense and it fights for its political-territorial autonomies the anticolonial and the criticism to the "neocolonial continuity" (Rivera, 2010) with the critic to the structures of the monocultural nation-state and the neoliberal capitalism. Thus, one of the elements of this counterhegemonic horizon developed in the rebel cycle (2000-2005) was, among other aspects, the demand and possibility of a plurinational State and the recognition, institution and full exercise of indigenous autonomy in ancestral community territories. that already before, during the nineties, they were recognized as collective lands. one

The transition to a plurinational State with autonomies (specifically ethnic-originary) implied, then, breaking with the monopoly and the pretension of the "monopoly of politics" present in the entire history of the State in Bolivia, that is, the establishment and development of a plurality of spaces and forms of self-government and indigenous autonomies.

The Pact of Unity was a space of political articulation of the main organizations (...)

However, in the first half of the current decade, there has been a shift away from constituent processes -generated and largely carried out by indigenous movements and other popular forces as a manifestation of social discontent and a challenge not only to the social and economic effects of the neoliberal model, but towards the political system as a whole - towards a scenario in which these actors and social forces will be subordinated or absent at the moment in which the government of Evo Morales began to deploy a policy of expansion of the extractivist model on indigenous territories that, in many cases, already had the character and condition of collective lands and territories constitutionally. This led to a break in the peasant-indigenous alliance in Bolivia, expressed in the Pact of Unity, 2 as evidenced by several territorial conflicts, mainly in the denominated low lands of this country, as it happened from the conflict of the TIPNIS (Indigenous Territory and Natural Park Isiboro-Sécure).

This has implied that, to a certain extent, the material and historical conditions for the construction of a "plurinational State" from the state structures themselves were being closed or, at least, there was a great setback in that sense, making evident a rearticulation of a neocolonial condition that defines the state reorganization in the region (Tapia, 2011). Thus, a truly counter-hegemonic horizon would be articulating today fundamentally around the community territorial resistances of indigenous peoples, movements and organizations against the expansion of an extractivist economic-territorial model, which predominates in the Bolivian government's state policies and which directly affects territories and community territorialities, confronting rural and indigenous populations, which manifestly claim a defense of their territories and demand the respect and exercise of their collective rights of self-determination.

Therefore, the perspective of open state transformation from cycles of social mobilization in the last decade in Bolivia, which had the premise of the decolonization of the State as a condition for the construction of a "Plurinational State" was, to a great extent,, result of the power and resistance of memories of cultures and indigenous and original peoples accumulated during centuries and decades of colonial, republican, nationalist and neoliberal domination, which emerged in a forceful way at the end of the century xx and that, even today, they continue to manifest themselves as community spaces of resistance and territorial nuclei of societal counterhegemony vis-à-vis the State and its territorial policies.

On the one hand, the issue of participation and prior consultation with indigenous peoples (as (...))

In this scenario, the current context in Bolivia is marked, among other aspects, by the reactivation of socioterritorial movements, particularly of indigenous character, in the face of dynamics and extractive activities and exploitation of "natural resources" by the current government on protected areas and / or indigenous territories, and their consequent dynamics of dispossession, specifically in the lowlands of Bolivia, where there is a series of socio-environmental conflicts, intensified by the recent government policies aimed at deepening and expanding the exploitation / exportation of "natural resources" ", Particularly hydrocarbons, without prior consultation and consent 3 that are established in international standards on the rights of peoples and recognized in the Bolivian constitution itself.

This translates into a series of negative effects and impacts on indigenous and rural communities, which reproduce their territoriality and their forms of community life in their ancestral territories. However, as pointed out by Molina (2016), prior consultation, among other mechanisms to face indigenous conflicts arising from territorial defense and extractivist progress, generates the division of indigenous organizations. As we will see later, in the case of the conflict over the TIPNIS, the subject of prior consultation and consent, the paradox of how this international legal instrument, conceived to guarantee the collective rights of indigenous peoples, will become a mechanism that will allow penetrate, condition and even divide the communities of a territory, making this right recognized a strategy of the *intelligenza* of a pattern of capitalist accumulation (with the legal and institutional platform of the State) to legitimize extractive projects and processes of socio-territorial dispossession.

David Harvey raises the concept of accumulation by dispossession, which consists of the use of methods (...)

These processes of capitalist expansion through an extractivist pattern, through the modality-following Harvey (2004) - of "accumulation by dispossession" 4 on community territories, have been generating or accentuating in recent years the reactivation of collective action and territorial defense. Precisely some socio-territorial conflicts directly confront the governmental vision of "development" and with rhetorical contents of a developmentalist profile, in front of a diversity of cosmovisions, community and / or ancestral territorialities, as well as a diversity of positions on the part of indigenous social actors of those territories, those that claim collective rights to self-determination and prior consultation on activities that affect their communities, territorialities and ways of life. This situation has recently been accentuated by the decision of the Bolivian government to allow and promote the exploration / exploitation of energy resources -especially hydrocarbons- in "protected areas".

A critical approach to the current situation in the lowlands of Bolivia is proposed, where indigenous political subjects would be configuring societal and socioterritorial movements of anti-neocolonial and counterhegemonic scope, starting from the processes of resistance, *r-existence* (Porto Gonçalves, 2013) and defense of their collective rights, their territories and territorialities. Likewise, it is proposed to problematize the relationship / tension between indigenous organizations and the State, specifically in the last MAS governments, from analyzing some specific cases such as the conflict - still in force - in the TIPNIS and the struggle of the Guaraní people in the Chaco in a context of expansion and intensification of extractive policies.

#### Brief considerations on the context

Bolivia is currently the second country with the largest indigenous population in all of South America, after Peru, and the first one at the subcontinental level with the highest percentage of indigenous population in relation to the total population of the country. Although Bolivia is generally considered as an eminently Andean, highland, Quechua and Aymara country, most of the territory comprises what is called lowland, in particular what is included in the macro-regions of the Amazon, Chiquitania and Chaco, where coexist 34 indigenous peoples. It is precisely this condition of ethnic, cultural and multisocietal diversity (Tapia, 2002) that constitutes Bolivia as a country with a plurinational character. What is today called constitutionally Plurinational state It expresses this multisocial condition, at the same time as it is the result of a process of historical accumulation of crisis cycles and social, political, cultural and territorial struggles that have been happening from the colonial era to the present, where the different moments of history of this country presents a large number and

meanings of sociopolitical events and processes that were shaping and transforming the collective imaginary of a country with a "variegated social conformation" (Zavaleta Mercado, 1985).

At the end of the nineties, the symptoms of the crisis of the neoliberal model and its economic, social and political effects began to manifest themselves in Bolivia. Thus, it initiates a "cycle of protests" (Tarrow, 2009) or a "rebel cycle" (Gutiérrez Aguilar, 2015) based on the collective action of social movements, popular organizations and indigenous peoples that carried a discourse that would not be limited to a criticism of the governments in turn, but reveals the vacuum of hegemony that left the political system and its partisan actors, who had alternated in the powers of the State for 15 years. Thus, the social demand in the political field, in addition to the conjunctural rejection of neoliberal state policies and a system of parties with strong signs of political illegitimacy, were aimed at questioning and challenging the structural bases of the political system and, in some cases, cases, of the very assumptions of the nation-state because of its character and not only neoliberal but monocultural, excluding and neocolonial, which among other demands would require state reform or refoundation (Santos 2010), through a Constituent Assembly (2006- 2007). Thus, the century xxi it opens in Bolivia with a cycle of social rebellions that configure "societal movements" (Tapia 2008), where the assumptions of the nation-state and the "pact" with society, that is, its "primordial form" ( Zavaleta Mercado, 1982).

What was called the agenda of October, result of the cycle of social rebellion (2000-2005) had (...)

This cycle of social rebellions, which has as one of its corollaries the establishment of a popular agenda, had the peculiarity of questioning not only the economic and social policies of the governments of the neoliberal stage, denouncing its resounding failure in the country, but the repression and the response from the power of the State produced a rapid articulation of several temporalities or cycles of mobilization and political rebellion, coming to demand the structural transformation of the State. In 2005 the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and Evo Morales were elected, and the so-called "process of change" began in Bolivia. Ten years have passed since Evo Morales became president of Bolivia, and today he is in his third term, backed by 64% of the votes in December 2009 and by 61% in October 2014; "There will be few Latin American governments that have been characterized by strong political-symbolic ruptures and great social and regional difficulties and conflicts such as the Morales government" (Svampa, 2010).

Since the approval and promulgation in 2009 of a New Political Constitution of the State as a result of the realization of the Constituent Assembly (2006-2007), of an intense process of political crisis and of a cycle of social mobilization that experienced the country since the beginning of the century xxi, the character of its statehood has been transformed (constitutionally), which would also have been the product of a crisis of the nation-state. The central nucleus of the state transformation, which establishes the new constitutional framework, will be the plurinational State character that is recognized and instituted in the country and that is the basis and the horizon of construction of a new political institutionality and the reference that would summarize the new "social pact" that allows "refounding the State" in Bolivia (Santos, 2010).

One of the central aspects that structurally reconfigures the character of the new Bolivian statehood, related to the very sustenance of the character of plurinationality, has to do with the recognition of the pre-existence of the indigenous and native peoples and nations. This point implies not only the formal recognition of cultural diversity but a challenge of great societal complexity, as a political and government model, which is what allowed, along with the other innovative aspects, to characterize the current Constitution of Bolivia as the vanguard of the then called "transformational

constitutionalism" (Santos, 2010). The organization and territorial structure of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has been the object of an important and transcendental change and innovation, when moving towards a State with a complex and complex typology, since it is defined as unitary and autonomous at the same time, that although not it is new within the modalities of statehood at the international level, it is a great innovation for the recognition of Indigenous Peasant Native Autonomy (AIOC) in its territorial structure.

Likewise, two transversal axes are key to understand the transforming nature of the current Bolivian Constitution, as the notion of "Living Well" as a principle and constitutional philosophy that would have been inspired by ideas of community matrix, and an alternative horizon to the idea of "development" conventional and in harmony with nature. However, the challenges of materializing the construction of a plurinational State entered into contradiction in recent years, among other things with the vision of the MAS government to monopolize political life, while consolidating an economic pattern based on extractivism, which will mark a conflicting socio-political context in recent years.

#### The indigenous irruption in the lowlands of Bolivia

In the 1980s, a critique of internal colonialism would be deployed in Bolivia (Gonzalez Casanova, 1969, Rivera, 2010), understood as an intra-state modality of reproducing colonial schemes of exclusion, subalternization and domination in particular towards indigenous subjects, through logics and systematic practices of state coloniality. Later, in the nineties social challenges to neoliberalism were manifested by various social movements, in particular of indigenous and peasant character and with the capacity to influence the political field of the State. These forms of community organization and unification that were denied, repressed or persecuted during the dictatorial period, returned to public political life with the recovery of democracy in the early eighties, and had a process of strengthening from its socioterritorial bases during the nineties and with force since 2000 in this country. These were constituted as fundamental entities for the articulation of lowland indigenous peoples and organizations, such as the Confederation of the Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian East (CIDOB). The emergence of these parent organizations of peasants and indigenous peoples represents a break with the syndicalist schemes - in particular peasant unionism - of sociopolitical organization inherited from the nationalism that the nation-state held in Bolivia.

It was in this context that, in the face of the neoliberal recomposition of internal colonialism in Bolivia, the reconstitution of several social subjects, such as the process of organization and unification of indigenous peoples, was deployed as a historical accumulation, more or less long, of lowlands, which previously had not experienced such a degree of articulation, unification and intercultural organization. In this way, there was a set of processes of organization of the centers and assemblies of the indigenous peoples that make up the CIDOB and, at the same time, processes of unification within each town and culture that have, maintain or reconstitute a form authority of their culture, which "emerge in a self-organized manner and with capacity for self-representation a set of collectivities, peoples and cultures that before they did not exist for the State and the rest of the civil society, who thought those territories as wild tribes" (Chavez et al., 2013: 51).

During the eighties and nineties, other forms and structures of political-cultural and territorial authority were manifested and made visible in the socio-political scenario of Bolivia, not only beyond the margins and limits of political-territorial control of the State, but organizational forms of community matrix that question and

demand the recognition of their collective rights as peoples and nations, as well as respect for their "territoriality", which was subject to the dynamics and effects of commodification and consequent looting under the schemes neoliberals. This was clearly manifested in the March for the Territory and Dignity convened in 1990 by lowland indigenous peoples and organizations in Bolivia.

From this historic indigenous mobilization convened in 1990, for the first time the Bolivian State recognizes indigenous people, particularly those from the lowlands, as valid interlocutors, which will later result in the recognition of property rights and administration of ancestral territories, through an important reform that took place at the level of the territorial structure with the recognition of the Communal Lands of Origin (TCO) as a form of collective property of the land. Thus, from 1990 until today there have been almost a dozen indigenous marches, which implies that there is a struggle and sustained criticism of the structures of domination and reproduction of modalities of "internal colonialism" (González Casanova, 1969) in the country., which will be assumed by indigenous movements as self-determination in their territories.

The organizational development and the mobilization repertoires of the indigenous peoples of the lowlands was a fundamental aspect within a new wave of organizational processes and re-politicization on the part of "civil society" in Bolivia, from organizations that represent other societies that were subalternized from the colony, during the formation of the postcolonial liberal republic and during the periods of the nation-state and the neoliberal state, in a neocolonial way. In this sense, the set of processes of organization and mobilization of the indigenous peoples of the lowlands has been a fundamental factor, although not the only one, which led to a series of constitutional reforms during the 1990s.

With the current CPE approved in 2009, the TCOs were renamed as Indigenous Peasant Territories (TIOC), which also constitute a concrete modality to transition to the condition of Indigenous Peasant Native Autonomy (AIOC). A) Yes, both plurinationality and indigenous autonomy, established as central and innovative aspects of the current Bolivian Constitution, would not be the product of the *intelligenza* of the State or the imagination of the MAS government, but the fruit of collective imaginary, historical demands and political struggles of indigenous social movements, for their politico-territorial autonomy claimed against the nation-state.

From these community-ancestral social movements have emerged several, if not the most important, socio-political imaginaries and the principles of the current process of state transformation in this country. Thus, within the edges presented by the so-called Bolivian "process of change", which had as its central core the constitutional mandate for the construction of the Plurinational, Community and Autonomic State, the figure of indigenous autonomy is a fundamental pillar. From these social movements and the opening of a process of state transformation, through a "constitutive moment" (Zavaleta Mercado, 1985) have been configured as true "societal movements" (Tapia, 2008), which still continue in force as forms of protest, rebellion and social mobilization that they question and disrupt the very nature of the nation-state, by questioning its policies and ways of reproducing inequality between peoples and cultures.

Likewise, these community demands and politico-territorial demands of indigenous movements, with a societal character, return today with strong criticism of the orientation and direction taken by the aforementioned "process of change" in this country and the government of Evo Morales, which is contested by indigenous organizations, among other questions for having monopolized the State and recentralized the policy in the country and breach the constitutional mandate of plurinational transformation of the State. In this way, several indigenous movements were demanding a reorientation of the so-called "process of change" towards the

transforming contents and meanings of the State and the materialization of the plurinational premise and decolonizing horizon that emerged in the country at the beginning of this century. Thus, socioterritorial movements of indigenous character are currently returning to constitute political subjects with the capacity to mobilize and interpellate the State, configuring in turn socio-territorial nuclei of societal counterhegemony in this country.

Indigenous re-emergence as a societal movement in Bolivia

For some years now, the scenario where social, environmental and social-territorial conflicts have been manifested is precisely in the lowland regions of the country, where indigenous and community movements are organized and mobilized mainly around the defense of their rights, territorialities and their collective rights. Some of these conflicts and movements express actions of defense, mobilization and socioterritorial disputes against policies of expansion and extractive intensification by the MAS government. Among the most recent and expressive highlights the conflict over the indigenous defense of the TIPNIS (Indigenous Territory and Isiboro-Sécure National Park) in part of the Amazon region of the country, which had as its maximum moment of visibility the two indigenous marches (2011 and 2012) in defense of this territory against government plans for the imposition of a road as part of geopolitical infrastructure projects aimed at extraction. Another of these movements of territorial resistance occurs with the struggle for territorial rights and indigenous autonomy of the Guaraní people in the Bolivian Chaco region, in the face of government policies aimed at limiting / subordinating autonomy or with interventions to guarantee extraction projects, mainly hydrocarbons, violating recognized collective rights.

These "socio-environmental conflicts" (Martínez Alier, 2004) have generated actions of territorial defense by the indigenous populations and of vindication of their collective rights, against the current policies of expansion of an extractive modality of capitalist accumulation by the government Bolivian, making evident at the same time contradictions and setbacks around constitutional mandates / principles, such as the "plurinationality of the State" itself and the imaginary of "Living Well" or "decolonization", through the imposition of a state and governmental vision of developing. In this way, a wave of social resistance is generated in these territories and local spaces, identified as socioterritorial movements, which in turn reactivate anticolonial and societal movements that arise as part of the "eco-territorial turn" (Svampa, 2012). the social movements in Latin America. These are ways to reactivate the collective action of socioterritorial subjects that challenge part of the policies and plans of the ruling MAS party, which along the lines of the so-called "progressive governments", as Gandarillas (2016) points out, "supports the economic model anchored in the exportation of raw materials, which benefit Finally, the multinational power groups, because of this, move away from popular sectors that are affected or oppose their policies "(2016: 114).

The indigenous defense of the TIPNIS. An open wound and a current fight

The unilateral determination in 2010 by the government of Evo Morales to build a road from Villa Tunari (Cochabamba) to San Ignacio de Moxos (Beni) unleashed a deep controversy in this country in recent years, based on the reaction of indigenous organizations to prevent this road from passing through the core of the TIPNIS (Indigenous Territory and Isiboro-Sécure National Park), demanding respect for indigenous territoriality and the respective prior consultation of indigenous peoples, as established in the current Bolivian Constitution and norms international organizations such as ILO Convention 169 or the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Thus, the TIPNIS, in addition to constituting a territory protected

by national regulations due to its status as a natural park (protected area), is claimed by the local populations for being "indigenous territory", protected by international conventions as part of the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples and nations, as well as the Bolivian constitutional text.

This conflict will not only unfold of a dispute over a projected highway without the corresponding prior consultation, or a particular tension between the MAS government and the indigenous communities and organizations of the TIPNIS, but it will imply a background that shows a contrast between productive practices, economic dynamics, visions on development and territorial logics of different and incompatible scale (Paz, 2012), since in the TIPNIS it is possible to identify the presence and overlap of different logics or development models that express different economic-territorialvisions and that "they are linked in a different way with the development proposals promoted by the government of Evo Morales" (Paz, 2012: 14 ff.).

On the one hand, there is an economic logic that has its material bases in what it calls the "Amazonian ethnic economy" on the part of the indigenous communities that develops based on the collective use, access and use of forest goods collectively., from a community territorial management, that is to say, a certain territoriality built ancestrally by the peoples that inhabit this territory. On the other hand, there is an economic logic that has material bases in the economy of coca leaf production, which is driven by the Andean colonizers and that develops based on the axis of use and use of forest goods in the form individual-mercantile (Soto, 2011). Finally, there would be the vision of the State, which based on a logic of territorial "control" has historically tried to establish a presence in the TIPNIS, deploying different policies of "occupation" of the territory.

Figure 1 - TIPNIS (Indigenous Territory and Isiboro-Sécure Natural Park)

Increase Original (png, 75k)

Source: self made.

The IIRSA, is the acronym for the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure Suramer (...)

In this way, since the second period MAS government (2009-2014), this state vision has taken a new momentum with new features and socio - territorial effects, from which can identify a nationalistic state policy and neoextractivista. Thus, the policies that project and promote the construction of a highway are part of a governmental vision of development that revolves around an economic model of capitalist expansion based predominantly on extractive dynamics, mainly exploitation / exportation of hydrocarbons and energy, as well as Infrastructure development plans for the extraction that would be linked to regional megaprojects under the IIRSA / COSIPLAN. 6 Thus, the government of Evo Morales, in fact, promotes the deployment of an economic model that ends up deepening the trend to economic outlets that are based on a primary export model. The conflict of the TIPNIS perhaps expresses exactly that: indigenous populations that reject the central plans of the extractive economic policy of dispossession, destroying their territory and their ways of life. Likewise, the TIPNIS conflict made visible mechanisms of territorial expansion and capitalist accumulation that extend market relations, progressively integrating the indigenous territory into the economic space of coca production, and also placed on the geopolitical map oil, mining and other capitals. of the financial speculation generated by the class struggle (Molina, 2016).

As a result of the VIII Indigenous March in defense of the TIPNIS, the government signed an agreement with the marchers in which, in part, it undertook to "agree" on future laws that involve indigenous peoples, especially those related to hydrocarbons, and elaborate a general law of consultation with indigenous peoples. In this sense, as the study by Ortiz and Costas (2010) points out, beyond the advantages

and disadvantages of the government road project, it suffered from a crucial flaw: its promoters failed to comply with the "right to prior consultation" with indigenous people.. This right is enshrined in the Constitution and is endorsed by Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO), recognized by the Bolivian State; "No government authority has asked our opinion on the road, even though we support the government", then he claimed an indigenous leader of the TIPNIS.

In the vast majority of Latin American countries, greater awareness has been created about the obligator (...)

In this scenario, the debate arose about the "binding" nature or not of the consultation, in which the indigenous communities of the TIPNIS and part of the community organizations of the lowlands question the government's understanding that Consultation to the peoples indigenous is not binding. 7 It is from here that it is possible to begin to glimpse the institutional dilemmas of the "Plurinational State" and the political positions that "reason" their institutional life without the radical consequences of the political principle of "self-determination", the right to autonomy and self-government

The conflict around the TIPNIS, as a "problem" still unresolved and an open debate and dispute in Bolivia, presents a great complexity in terms of the multiple dimensions involved (territorial, economic, sociocultural, political) structurally traversed by the "Tension of territorialities" (Porto-Gonçalves et al., 2013) as a base element on which the spatio-temporal senses of these dimensions unfold. In this sense, it is also important to highlight the dimension referring to the sociopolitical contours that will emerge with the conflict around the TIPNIS, which help us in part to understand the current political context that Bolivia is going through, particularly referring to the relationship of social movements of matrix indigenous communities with state and government structures, that this conflict reconfigures from tensions and disputes over territory and territoriality, as an essentially political and societal dimension.

There is no doubt that one of the points of inflection or moments of crisis of the so - called "process of change" in Bolivia is marked by the socioterritorial conflict of the TIPNIS, which quickly becomes a socio-political macro-conflict. Given that, of the plurality of conflicts that will be manifested during the second term of Evo Morales, which are mostly related to social disagreements about government policies and post-constitutional norms (Chavez et al. , 2013; Wanderley, 2013), the most intense moment of political ruptures occurred around the TIPNIS conflict since 2011, as "a set of deep-seated ruptures and ruptures, to a certain extent irreversible, not only between indigenous organizations and the government, but also inside Bolivian society itself [which represented the rupture and end of the Unity Pact ] and of confrontations between indigenous communities with fractions of the peasant movement and settler-cocalero "(Chávez et al., 2013).

The indigenous mobilization in defense of the TIPNIS, of the indigenous lowland organizations and the subsequent repressive governmental reactions, will make visible a series of "contradictions" between the official discourse of the government, in particular, referred to, then, its supposed character of "government of social movements "and an orientation and political practice with authoritarian features and, perhaps, at moments explicitly of anti-indigenous and neocolonial profile (Tapia, 2011). Thus, the TIPNIS conflict, by questioning the governmental perspective on the "plurinational" nature of the State and the collective rights of indigenous peoples, reinstated a debate in the country around the very orientation of the State, the nation and the nation. policy, and consequently the orientation of the so-called "process of

change" in Bolivia, as well as the way of configuring state-society relations within the framework of a current policy of neo-extractive exacerbation.

From the conflict for the defense of the TIPNIS it is also possible to demonstrate, first, a distancing and then a rupture of relations, alliances and agreements that had been established and articulated since 2005 between the indigenous organizations and the MAS government with Evo Morales at the head, which will result from the deployment of the main axis of contradiction that organizes political relations in the country today (Tapia, 2011). This expresses, as mentioned above, the clash not only of two economic and territorial visions, but also of two "projects of different matrix and civilizational orientation" (Porto-Gonçalves et al., 2013), in which one implies the destruction of the other. On the one hand, the central nucleus of the project of the ruling party, consisting of a developmental state vision of a capitalist matrix and with an extractivist nucleus. A state vision that would contain a tripartite scheme: an expansion of state capitalism in interaction with transnational capital, based on the extraction of natural resources as raw materials, particularly hydrocarbons; an articulation with national private capital linked to agribusiness, and an expansion of the agricultural frontier, mainly coca, with an Andean entrepreneurial class and peasant turned into small, medium and large entrepreneurs. On the other hand, there would be the vision from the indigenous subjects, with a political project deployed long ago, which consists of the defense and recovery of indigenous territories, in which the diversity of cultures of the peoples living in the lowlands of Bolivia can be reproduced and displayed and the defense of their recognized territorial rights, which is what that puts the most important limits to capitalist expansion (Tapia, 2012) and the dynamics of "accumulation by dispossession" in full deployment in the country.

As Joensen (2015: 38) suggests, conflict of ITNPIS shows how the "neo-liberalism has adapted to the new realities in globalization and new left not only a limitation not present them, but they are functional. The ideas of modernization, growth and development indispensable for capital are still valid within visions that continue to suffer from epistemic colonialism".

In this context, although the tension between indigenous lowland organizations in Bolivia and the government of Evo Morales, especially since his second term in office (2009-2014), was marked by moments of tension, contradictions and fissures, from of the indigenous mobilization in defense of the TIPNIS, since 2011, these relations ended in irreconcilable ruptures to the present. These ruptures are marked dramatically with authoritarian and repressive episodes by the government. This series of governmental attacks on the part of the indigenous actors of Bolivia configures a facet of curiously "anti-indigenous" features from governmental structures that make visible a line or tendency from the State itself, of denying these actors the status of autonomous subjects, that is to say of "political subjects", bearers of visions, interests and own projects (Tapia, 2012), which expresses one of the most authoritarian facets of the current ruling party: the denial of autonomy to indigenous peoples.

Currently, this anti-indigenous facet of the MAS government is manifested in the recent abrogation of Law 180, which is considered a social conquest of the VIII Indigenous March of 2011 to establish the protection and intangibility of this indigenous territory and area protected, which prevented the construction of projects such as the aforementioned road. By repealing this rule, despite the mobilizations of the indigenous peoples and organizations of the TIPNIS and the enactment of Law 969 of August 2017, the alleged "protection, integral and sustainable development of the TIPNIS" is declared, although in the contents specific to its articles, it becomes evident how this territory is again left unprotected when it is opened to exploitation and commodification activities, mainly of its natural wealth, by national and transnational

capitals, since it enables extractive projects (Article 6 and Article 8, Law 969) and the use of natural resources by private parties (Article 12), among other provisions that show how this law points to a flagrant setback in what was achieved and conquered in terms of the socio-territorial protection of this territory.

The autonomy Guarani Indian: between subordination and self-determination

Regarding the issue of indigenous autonomies, which has been one of the most controversial of the constituent process and the post-constitutional period of the last decade in Bolivia, it had as one of the main protagonists the Guaraní people and their parent organization, the Assembly of the Guaraní People (APG), with the demand for the reconstitution of its territory through the figure of political-territorial autonomy, but that also had as a background the tension with the State to consolidate that autonomy in a context of permanent conflict around territorial rights and in particular the right to prior consultation, as well as tensions with extractive companies, mainly of exploitation of hydrocarbons in the territories of the Guaraní people in various areas of the Bolivian Chaco region, where the largest amount of gas and oil in the country is located.

Thus, once the new Political Constitution of the State was approved in Bolivia and with the opening of the post-constituent period, beginning in 2009, a growing tension began to emerge between the government of Evo Morales and the indigenous and campesino-indigenous movements, in around disputes over territories and "natural resources", where it is possible to observe how the collective actions of the Guaraní people, in dispute over their territories and natural resources, enabled a process of identity reconfiguration as a people (Wahren, 2012). The issue of indigenous autonomy thus appears as a concrete horizon of the collective actions of the Guaraní people and organization and their community bases in their ancestral territories, as well as the demands for territorial recognition, the defense of natural resources and a "plurinational State". With this demand, the Guaraní nation demanded not only territorial autonomy but also its vision had claiming horizons that have to do, in a certain dimension, with the reconstitution of their ancestral territory which involves, in some way, a community control over natural resources that are in the subsoil.

In this sense, together with the demand for political-territorial autonomy, the Guaraní people demanded that the State respect the right to be consulted on the exploitation of natural resources (hydrocarbons), and to be compensated for their socio-environmental impacts. Thus, the situation that occurs in the Guaraní territory, where the largest percentage of all hydrocarbon reserves in Bolivia and where they currently operate the largest fields of hydrocarbon exploitation, promoted by the government, in charge of transnational corporations, is particularly problematic. oil extractions and from the state company YPFB. Thus, the demands and demands of the Guaraní people, referred to the full exercise of their collective rights and the growing demand for territorial and political autonomy, they have as a central axis the reconstitution of their original territory, which expresses the reconstitution of their collective identity as a people and as a political subject that claims self-government.

With the new legal political scenario configured in Bolivia from the promulgation of the current Political Constitution of the State (2009), and in particular in the theme of territorial organization and a new regional regime with the approval of the Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization (LMAD) (2010), in December 2009, eleven municipalities, through a referendum, were instituted as indigenous autonomies in the country, thus initiating their autonomy process. In the case of the Guaraní territory in the Bolivian Chaco, the municipality of Charagua (in the department of Santa Cruz) developed its autonomic process, specifically referring to the

elaboration of its "statutes" of indigenous autonomy. Processes that will mean intense consultation and discussion processes in the communities and their organizational instances, and where at the same time a set of principles, meanings and worldview are expressed as a people.

This process was full of tensions and a network of political strategies by the MAS government aimed at controlling it. In the context of the elaboration of its autonomous status, like that of the LMAD itself, it can be identified, according to Garcés (2013), at least two positions between the MAS government and indigenous organizations; On the part of the former, the will to "reduce" the scope of indigenous autonomy is made clear, while organizations demand that his autonomy be full; that is, that expresses his right to self-determination and self-government. As the case of the autonomous process of the Guarani people in Charagua shows, this indigenous autonomic process, having met all the requirements demanded by the CPE and the LMAD to exercise its self-government, within the framework of what is legally required, clashes with the modalities, obstacles and delays on the part of the state agencies in relation to this process of indigenous autonomy, which gave account of a state policy aimed at subordinating, under an institutionalist and systematic logic, bureaucratic control from state instances of the State, the nature and scope of said indigenous autonomy (Exeni, 2015, López, 2017).

Referring to the Supreme Decree n.º 2366 (2015) of the MAS government to allow *aprovechami* (...)

Also, a specific issue that has been claimed and demanded by the Guarani people is the exercise of the right to prior consultation for the consent or not of any activity related to the exploitation of natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, in their territory. This situation of permanent siege and authoritarian imposition of an "extractive territoriality" (Wahren, 2012) in the Bolivian Chaco and systematic violation of recognized collective rights of the communities that inhabit it became evident in the recent conflict of the Community Land of Origin (TCO) Guarani Takovo Mora in the Chaco region of the department of Santa Cruz, where the indigenous communities of the Guarani people mobilized in the defense of their legally recognized community territory, in the face of new government regulations 8 that allow the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in the 22 protected areas of the country, including this indigenous territory.

This mobilization of the communities and indigenous Guarani organization of Takovo Mora demands, as in the case of the TIPNIS, the realization by the State and the government of the respective prior consultation, as a collective right established in the current Bolivian Constitution, in relationship with hydrocarbon exploitation projects by state company YPFB. In this way, the indigenous communities of this territory demanded to be consulted about the exploitation of natural resources and demanded a compensation for the environmental damages in their territory. This also shows a complexity of positions and visions within the indigenous organizations themselves regarding the prior consultation and the mechanisms of participation and compensatory "benefits" that can be obtained or not from the process for the communities (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2014).

However, one of the aspects that caused the indignation of the indigenous peoples of the lowlands, of the rest of the community organizations and of the Bolivian population in general, was the brutal repression with which the current MAS government responded to the mobilization of the indigenous Guarani communities of Takovo Mora. This new repressive action on the part of the government reissued what happened four years ago (September 2011) with the brutal and planned repression in the town of Chaparina to the VIII Indigenous March in defense of the TIPNIS and made evident, once again, perhaps the authoritarian and anti-indigenous facet of the

Bolivian government, through the use and monopoly of force (police) to apply and impose, in an unconsulted, undemocratic and unconstitutional way, its vision of territorial policy, in this case, to make viable its settled extractive policy in the exploitation / export of hydrocarbons predominant in the Bolivian Chaco region.

In this sense, the difficulties and limits in the recognition of indigenous territories are directly associated to these disputes with the extractive policies, since the strategic zones for the extraction of oil and gas are located in the ancestral territory of the Guaraní nation. of the Bolivian Chaco. This is one of the main reasons why the issue of collective rights, in particular the right to prior consultation directly linked to the right to self-determination and the constitutional mandate of indigenous autonomy, is one of the most tense and dispute of the country at present.

conclusion

Since the beginning of this decade, the re-emergence of socioterritorial movements has been manifested in Bolivia, mainly around the so-called "socio-environmental conflicts" (Martínez Alier, 2004), as in the case of the TIPNIS conflict, specifically carried out by indigenous movements on the part of the Bolivian Amazon, but also these socioterritorial movements seem to configure, again, societal movements (Tapia, 2008), the same ones that affirm themselves as part of the "Plurinational State" that is increasingly distant in its materialization, and this they do so with the emphasis on claiming their own territoriality as peoples and demanding the full exercise of their collective (recognized) rights of self-determination and self-government. In the cases that we briefly address, it would be social movements that demand autonomy, within the framework of a plurinational State that these same actors would have promoted in the dawn of this century in Bolivia.

In recent years, in Bolivia, a truly counter-hegemonic horizon would be articulated fundamentally around the communal territorial resistances of indigenous peoples and movements against the expansion of an extractive model, promoted as a form of capitalist accumulation and expansion from the State itself., which not only affects ecosystems irreversibly, but displaces and diverts territories, populations and cultures. These territorial defense movements, at the same time, express a defense of their collective rights of self-determination and self-government. In that sense, the wave of expansion of the counter-hegemonic horizon that opened in the Bolivian founding conjuncture at the beginning of the 21st century and produced a constituent assembly and structural reforms of the State in Bolivia, at present it would be retreating to the nuclei of indigenous resistance that manifest themselves in the lowlands.

What became evident with the conflict of the TIPNIS and the clear position of the current Bolivian government, would be perhaps forms of denial and blockade of the very nature of indigenous autonomy established in the Political Constitution of the State (CPE), which includes the ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, that recognize the fundamental right of the original peoples and nations to their self-determination. This principle of self-determination, in the case of the autonomic process of the Guaraní people and particularly in the TIPNIS conflict, will have been violated and violated. On the one hand, since there has not been a real, consensual and transparent process of prior consultation, as established by national and international standards, and on the other hand, ignoring the historical and representative organizations of indigenous peoples.

Currently in Bolivia, we would be witnessing a complex moment of dispute over the exercise of indigenous autonomy and the exercise of collective rights of indigenous peoples, which also implies a possible closure of the conditions for the possibility of implementing state plurinationality as a societal horizon, where social demands,

resistances and indigenous political-territorial struggles such as those that arise in the lowlands can not be understood separately from processes of socio-cultural, political and territorial decolonization and overcoming old patterns of the State -nation. This is what I would have assumed and shaped the current Bolivian Constitution, which nevertheless finds its own limits in the same State and in some of the current policies of the MAS government. In any case, the community forms of practicing the territory, of non-destructive social relations of nature and other forms of socio-political practices, seem to continue to be present in the communities and in their demands for collective rights, in their resistances and socio-territorial re-existences and in its constructions and autonomous horizons.

### References

1. Garcés, Fernando (2013), The indigenous people and their national (pluri) state: a look at the Bolivian constituent process. Cochabamba, Bolivia: JAINA / FHyCE - UMSS / CLACSO.
2. González Casanova, Pablo (1969), Sociology of exploitation. Mexico: XXI century.
3. Gutiérrez Aguilar, Raquel (2015). Community-popular horizon: antagonism and production of the common in Latin America. Cochabamba: SOCEE / Self-determination.
4. Harvey, David (2004), The 'new' imperialism. Madrid: AKAL.
5. Joensen, Lilian Graciela (2015), "Bolivia between extractivism and Living Well", Other logos - Journal of Critical Studies, 6, 14-40.
6. López Flores, Pabel Camilo (2017), "A process of decolonization or a period of recolonization in Bolivia? The indigenous autonomies in the lowlands during the MAS government ", RELIGACIÓN. Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, II (6), 48-66.
7. Martínez Alier, Joan (2004), The environmentalism of the poor: environmental conflicts and languages of valuation. Barcelona: ICARIA / FLACSO.
8. Molina, Patricia (2016), "Extractivism, territory and conflicts in Bolivia", Oil in Latin America - Bolivia (Virtual activism network). Retrieved on 12.11.2017, at <http://www.oilwatchesudamerica.org/petroleo-en-sudamerica/bolivia/5049-extractivismo-territorio-y-conflictos-en-bolivia.html>.
9. Ortiz, María Virginia; Costas, Patricia (2010), "TIPNIS, Coca and a Highway Lurk to Loma Santa: Indigenous Territory in Cochabamba and Beni", Indigenous Territories, Original Peasants, Case Study No. 2. La Paz: Fundación Tierra, 265 -287.
10. Paz, Sarela (2012), "The conflict of the Isiboro-Sécure National Park (TIPNIS) and its consequences for the Plurinational State of Bolivia", in Rafael Bautista; Marxa Chávez; Patricia Chávez; Raúl Prada; Luis Tapia (coords.), The indigenous victory of TIPNIS. La Paz, Bolivia: Self-determination.
11. Porto-Gonçalves, Carlos Walter; Betancour, Milson (2013). Latin American crossroads in Bolivia: the conflict of the TIPNIS and its civilizatory implications. La Paz, Bolivia: Self-determination.
12. Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia (2010), Ch'ixinakax utxiwa: Reflection on decolonizing practices and discourses. Buenos Aires: Ink Limón.

13. Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (2010), *Refoundation of the State in Latin America. Perspectives from an epistemology of the South*. Lima: International Institute of Law and Society / PDTG.
14. Schilling-Vacaflor, Almut (2014), "Contestations over Indigenous Participation in Bolivia's Extractive Industry: Ideology, Practices, and Legal Norms", *GIGA Working Papers*, 254.
15. Soto, Gustavo (2011), *The metaphor of TIPNIS*. Cochabamba: CEADESC.
16. Svampa, Maristella (2010), "The 'Bolivian laboratory': changes, tensions and ambivalence of the government of Evo Morales", in Maristella Svampa; Pablo Stefanoni; Bruno Fornillo (comps.), *Debatir Bolivia: perspectives of a decolonization project*. Good
17. Svampa, Maristella (2012), "Consensus of commodities, ecoterritorial turn and critical thinking in Latin America", *OSAL: Observatorio Social de América Latina*, 32, 15-38.
18. Tapia, Luis (2002), *The multisociety condition: multiculturalism, pluralism, modernity*. La Paz, Bolivia: CIDES-UMSA / Muela del Diablo.
19. Tapia, Luis (2008), *Wild politics*. La Paz, Bolivia: CLACSO / Self-determination.
20. Tapia, Luis (2011), "The configuration of a counterhegemonic horizon in the Andean region", *Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana: International Journal of Ibero-American Philosophy and Social Theory*, 53, 119-125.
21. Tapia, Luis (2012), "The lowland peoples as a consistent plural minority", in Rafael Bautista et al. (comps.), *The indigenous victory of TIPNIS*. La Paz: Self-determination, 253-295.
22. Tarrow, Sidney (2009), *Power in movement. Social movements, collective action and politics*. Madrid: Alliance.
23. Wahren, Juan (2012), "The organizational reconstruction of the Guarani people in Bolivia and their collective actions in the territory", *Sociedad & Equidad*, 4, 44-63. DOI: 10.5354 / 0718-9990.2012.20939